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One Small Step: The Past, Present, and Future of the Federal Sentencing System   
The federal sentencing guidelines, which focus on offense based statistical consistency, 
had a ripple effect that molded the entire federal sentencing system in it’s wake; this 
article is an individual case study demonstrating the flaws of a consistency based 
sentencing system, the injustice such a system can create, and why United States v. 
Booker is only the first step in creating a fair and effective sentencing system.    
 
I. Introduction 
Theoretical viewpoints as to the purpose and methods of punishment have been a 
thread in the fabric of the American justice system since its inception.  Over the past 
several decades there has been a push, largely by conservative groups and lawmakers, for 
consistency and severity in sentencing.  I argue that although statistical consistency is an 
element of fairness in theory, the multitude of differences in every human being, every 
circumstance, and every incidence of crime, makes true consistency in sentencing nearly 
impossible.  Focusing predominantly on consistency as a sentencing theory is contrary to 
the most important factor of criminal sentencing, assuring that each individual convicted 
of a crime receives the sentence he or she actually deserves.  Matching actual culpability 
to the sentence imposed will never be a perfect science, but given our societal practice of 
treating humans as individuals, the goal of sentencing should be to get as close a match as 
possible.  With this paper I demonstrate the flaws in the consistency approach through a 
case study of a current Federal prisoner.   
In order to reach the level of consistency lauded by conservatives as necessary, 
the techniques employed in a new Federal sentencing system would likely have to mirror 
those in the old system in several key ways.  The purpose of this paper is to establish the 
flaws in such an approach.  Part I is an overview of the background of the push for 
2consistency in sentencing and also introduces the case that will be individually studied.  
Part II addresses four aspects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that have often been 
criticized and that provide substantial evidence of the injustice that can result from a goal 
as restrictive as statistical consistency in sentencing.  The areas of concern are the 
complexity necessary for consistency, the rigidity necessary to deter discretion, the 
procedural injustices of real offense sentencing, and the change in role of the parties 
involved in the sentencing process.  Each section is preceded by narrative looks into how 
these aspects directly affected our individual case study.  Part III addresses the 
fundamental issue of the meaning of consistency and why statistical consistency is an 
inappropriate measure for sentencing.  Part IV focuses briefly on ideas for the future 
including parole, less complicated guidelines, alternative forms of punishment, and the 
elimination of mandatory minimum sentences.   
I. Background – A Great Idea  
 When Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 19841 the vision was of 
“an interactive guidelines process involving federal judges, the Department of Justice, the 
Probation System, the Bureau of Prisons, and the Federal Public Defenders.”2 These 
systems would work together using the wealth of statistical and anecdotal data available 
in order to create an enlightened system that would develop and grow over time.3
Lawmakers, scholars and the judiciary were calling for sentencing reform and for a 
sentencing scheme that better reflected the various purposes of punishment.4 There was 
 
1 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984). 
2 Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of 
Sentencers, 101 Yale L.J. 1681, 1694 (1992).  
3 Id. 
4 See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1972) (Frankel’s desire for 
change in sentencing is largely considered the genesis of the sentencing reform movement).  
3distaste with judges basing sentences on factors determined individually and that were 
reflective of irrelevant socioeconomic characteristics such as race and income.5 There 
was also fear that judicial use of a seemingly endless number of factors was leading to 
inconsistent sentencing in similar cases.6 Statistics showed different sentences for similar 
crimes, but research into the roots of the differences was insufficient, in fact most judges 
attributed the differences to circumstantial factors and not judicial discretion.7 So began 
the obsession with consistency in sentencing to the detriment of all other related factors.  
In the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,8 the focus was on standardization of 
the law of sentencing, most of the effort in creation of the Guidelines went to assigning 
fixed ranges of punishment for every crime, with fixed value and process for taking into 
account any surrounding circumstances.9 “Important questions like burdens of proof, 
hearing procedures, and fact-finding procedures were left to the implementation of 
individual judges.”10 In addition, a multitude of equally important factors in punishment 
including rehabilitation, age, education, vocational skills, mental condition, family 
circumstances, and many others were deemed irrelevant.11 What was most disturbing 
about the change in thought process which led to the Guidelines was that the change was 
not based on the fundamental concepts of fairness as initially conceived but was heavily 
influenced by republican political agendas such as the war on drugs, law and order, and 
 
5 Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 883, 895-97 (1990).  
6 Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 
904, 915-19 (1962). 
7 Freed, supra note 2, at 1743.  
8 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2004). 
9 Margareth Etienne, Parity, Disparity, and Adversariality: First Principles of Sentencing, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 
309, 312 (2005).   
10 Id. 
11 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H.1.1-1.6 (2004).  
4severity of punishments.12 Although the Booker13 decision made the Guidelines 
advisory, they are still to be used as the model of sentencing in this country and thus 
remain a prime example of the injustice that results from focusing on empirical 
consistency. 
From the outset, the Guidelines were criticized for their complexity, rigidity, 
procedural and substantive unfairness, and their severity.14 In addition “any marginal 
reduction in disparity that has come from the complexity and rigidity of the system has 
been more than offset by unwarranted uniformity.”15 Although the concept of sentencing 
guidelines could have brought organization to a very unstable and varied system, in 
practice there was significant injustice.  This injustice came to the forefront in the recent 
Supreme Court decisions of Apprendi v. New Jersey16, Blakely v. Washington17, and 
United States v. Booker.18 Collectively these cases established the unconstitutionality of 
the guidelines and rendered them advisory.19 In the wake of Booker, Blakely, and 
Apprendi the public is now witness to the injustices of the federal sentencing guidelines, 
and is also presented with opportunities for improving sentencing in the future.  There 
continues, however, to be a conservative push for statistical outcome consistency through 
measures such as mandatory minimum sentencing and topless sentencing ranges.20 The 
next several years will present our legislature and courts with many important questions 
and with these questions opportunities to develop sentencing regulation that accurately 
 
12 Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 37, 41 (2005). 
13 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260 (2005). 
14 David Yellen, Saving Federal Sentencing Reform after Apprendi, Blakely and Booker, 50 Vill. L. Rev. 
163, 179 (2005).   
15 Id. at 186.  
16 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
17 542 U.S. 296 (2004) 
18 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
19 Id. 
20 Yellen, supra note 14, at 174, 179. 
5reflects the crimes committed, is fair and flexible, yet lacks unexplainable disparities.  
This article explores the experiences of a federal prisoner and demonstrates the flaws in a 
rigid statistically based system.  
A. Case Study: Roberto Natale 
Statistics on the merits or injustice of a sentencing scheme based on statistical 
consistency are available and often presented, supporting both sides of the equation.  In 
spite of all of the proclaimed benefits of such a rigid system, I present a case that proves 
otherwise, a case that shows not only how the entire sentencing process has been molded 
in the wake of the guidelines, but also how a statistical consistency based system in fact 
produces punishments unrelated to culpability.  This is not a case study of a fringe case or 
the outlying example of injustice, but a common case with few exceptional 
circumstances.  This case shows that under such a system, the actual crime committed 
and the rehabilitation and punishment for the crime are only minor factors in the 
sentencing analysis.  Mr. Roberto Natale is a tragic and dramatic example of an offender 
falling prey to our sentencing system.  A first time offender, Mr. Natale received 19 years 
of prison time21, although it is clear that much of his time in prison had very little to do 
with his convicted crimes.  From the onset of his sentencing it was clear the proceeding 
had little to do with sentencing Natale as an individual and everything to do with 
application of the guidelines.  We enter a world where sentencing is reduced to issues of 
whether or not the guidelines apply, interpretation of the guidelines, and relevant conduct 
under the guidelines – issues that made up nearly ninety percent of Natale’s sentencing 
hearing. 
 
21 Sentencing transcript at 86, United States v. Natale, No. 90-6194-CR (S.D. Fla. January 3, 1997) 
[hereinafter Transcript]. 
6Roberto Natale, federal inmate number 29947-004, was born in Casolla Caserta 
Italy on June 18th 1943.22 Mr. Natale’s family was devastatingly poor and he and his 
brothers migrated to the United States in 1967 in search of a better life.23 Mr. Natale was 
physically and mentally abused as a child, and in general had a very tough upbringing.24 
Natale had a fifth grade education and had an ongoing battle with substance abuse.25 
Unable to read, write, or speak English, Natale went from business to business begging 
for cleaning jobs, often times being turned away as a result of his inability to 
communicate.26 After years of hard work Natale scraped together the income necessary 
to open his own business.  Capitalizing on his knowledge of foreign cars he and his 
brother opened a garage that specialized in repairing these vehicles, but life was still a 
struggle.27 At some point a regular customer at his garage, Bruno Sorrocco, pulled Mr. 
Natale into a scheme that would change the rest of his life.  Sorrocco was the head of an 
international drug dealing operation that was very large in its reach, operating from 1979 
to 1988.28 Natale allegedly becomes a part of the conspiracy from 1985-1986.29 Natale 
was never caught in commission of a crime nor was he arrested while in possession of 
illegal narcotics.30 All of the charges were based on testimony of government informants 
who claim witness to the acts some ten years prior to the trial and themselves were drug 
 
22 Presentence Report at 9, United States v. Roberto Natale, (S.D. Fla. October 4, 1996) (No. 90-6194-CR) 
[hereinafter Presentence Report]. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 10. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 3-7.   
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
7dealers who were given deals for their assistance.31 Natale was convicted of conspiracy 
to distribute cocaine as part of the operation and for 3 counts of possession with intent to 
distribute.32 
II. Learning from Past Mistakes: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
 It is a daunting task; confining every federal crime, every circumstance, and 
every judicial mind interpreting these factors within a rigid framework.  In practice, it 
makes sense only in the extreme fringes of abstract thinking.  For example, at first glance, 
it makes sense that two individuals, A and B, convicted of trafficking 10 kilograms of 
cocaine should receive the same sentence regardless of where they are sentenced.  But the 
error of this thinking is immediately apparent; it is based on the least information possible 
for each crime, the nature of the crime and the amount of the drug.  It logically follows 
that the more information one has about each crime and each defendant, the more 
distinguishable each case becomes.  For example, A is a 45 year old lawyer that uses his 
wife’s daycare business as a front for his cocaine trade, while B is twenty years old, was 
a part of the child welfare system all his life, has 2 children to support, and has only an 
eighth grade education.  The crime is the same, but do they really deserve the same 
sentence?  I think not.  Although the offense category may be the same, each of these 
 
31 Id.; When interviewing Natale he asserted that he did not know some of the informants, nearly all of the 
evidence against him came from these informants who themselves were given plea deals for providing 
information.  Professor Zlotnick did extensive research of many federal prisoners and came across similar 
cases where the defendants continuously assert that the informants that made up the crux of the evidence 
against them, and were themselves culpable and lied in order to help themselves.  David M. Zlotnick, 
Shouting Into the Wind:  District Court Judges and Federal Sentencing Policy, 9 Roger Williams U. L. 
Rev. 645, 664 (2004). 
32 “Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject 
to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the 
attempt or conspiracy.” 21 U.S.C. § 846, 963 (2000).  By passing this legislation, Congress mandated 
conspiracy charges be subject to guideline and mandatory minimum laws based on the underlying drug 
crime being conspired and not conspiracy as a separate crime.  Individuals are subject to drug crime 
penalties “even if he never had possession or even constructive possession of drugs.”  Zlotnick, supra note 
31, at 653.   
8individuals would benefit from a sentence tailored to their circumstances.  The desire for 
statistical consistency in sentencing has come hand in hand with a desire for rigidity, both 
factors raising many questions as to their effects on fairness, culpability, and the true goal 
of sentencing.  Although consistency, and alternatively, disparity in federal sentencing is 
one factor in appropriate federal punishment, there are many other factors that are 
seemingly ignored. Most important is the fact that many offenders, although categorically 
similar, actually should receive different sentences. 
 Although the guidelines are now advisory under Booker, judges are still required 
to use the guidelines reasonably and explain any actions taken in contravention to them.33 
There remains a strong requirement to justify sentences that are not in accordance with 
the guidelines.34 What the Booker decision fails to address is the reality that the entire 
sentencing system and related processes have been molded around the complexity of the 
guidelines making sentencing a very mechanical process based largely on guideline 
interpretation.35 Those who are not directly involved in the process often have difficulty 
comprehending the rigid disregard of important factors, the complexity of the process, 
and the bizarre results.36 Equally as important, the guidelines have caused the roles of 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, to change dramatically.37 The 
following views each of these factors individually through the eyes of Roberto Natale and 
demonstrates that Booker alone is not enough to fix the problems created by the 
 
33 Booker, 543 U.S. at 260. 
34 Id. at 262. 
35 Yellen, supra note 14, at 185.  
36 Freed, supra note 2, at 1728.  
37 Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of The Right To Council in Federal Criminal Courts: An 
Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing Guidelines,
92 Cal. L. Rev. 425 (2004). 
9Guidelines.  These problems also demonstrate that in the future we must move away from 
statistical consistency as the basis for our sentencing system.    
A. The More You Know, the Harder It Gets – A Rigid System 
 Roberto Natale had a clean record prior to these convictions, he was not a career 
criminal.38 Natale was not violent during his alleged crimes or upon being taken into 
custody.39 Natale kept no weapons and was not associated with any violent men or 
involved in any violent events.40 The last action he made in furtherance of the drug 
conspiracy occurred ten years before he was sentenced, and he had been out of the 
“business” for nearly that entire time.41 Natale was fifty four years old at the time of his 
sentencing and faced confinement into his seventies.42 Mr. Natale was considered a good 
person by his family and his community and was hardly a threat at his age. 43 Mr. Natale 
was living a modest life, rebuilding a relationship with his sons.44 Mr. Natale lived a 
very hard and impoverished life, was abused mentally and physically as a child, and had 
only a fifth grade education.45 Mr. Natale was battling with a substance abuse problem at 
the time of his arrest.46 These factors are important, and some could say essential to 
punishing and rehabilitating a person convicted of crime.  However, not one of these 
factors was taken into consideration in Natale’s sentencing.  Even if the judge were 
 
38 Presentence Report at 9. 
39 Id. at 3-7. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 3-7. 
42 Id. at 2. 
43 “As far as the community is concerned…everybody would look to him as someone – you need help, he 
would be there to help you.  He’s never harmed anybody physically…he is a really good man.”  Transcript 
at 82. (character witness).  “He never demonstrated any extravagance in wealth.  I think he is an asset to the 
community.  He was a hard-working, good person.  And I think he may have had poor judgment in getting 
involved with the wrong people, but he certainly is not the image of what we would see as some kind of 
drug dealer.” Id. at 83. 
44 Id. 
45 Presentence Report at 9. 
46 Id. at 10.  
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lenient and decided to consider that Natale was almost entirely rehabilitated at the time of 
sentencing, the guidelines required Natale to be sentenced between 17.5-21.5 years.47 
Not only was the sentencing judge prohibited from considering a multitude of factors 
seemingly essential to proper punishment, but the guidelines constrained him to move 
only 20% from the maximum sentence.  Natale’s circumstances are common, and often 
times even more dramatic.   
“Before we had the guidelines, one could express his true feelings.  You looked at 
the individual, his background, his prior record, his family and all that, and you 
presented those facts to the judge, and the judge had to agonize over what 
sentence was appropriate for that individual.  Now, we have to apply the 
guidelines not to that person, but to that crime.”48 
One of the most perplexing aspects of the guidelines is the declaration that many 
personal characteristics of offenders are not relevant to sentencing outside of the 
applicable range.49 Congressional mandate established that factors such as education, 
vocational skills, employment, family responsibilities, community ties, age, mental and 
emotional condition, drug dependence, and dependence on crime for a livelihood were 
generally inappropriate factors.50 When the sentencing commission decided to make 
consistent outcomes its primary objective, it had little choice but to deem personal 
characteristics irrelevant because in order to categorize the actions of a seemingly endless 
number of defendants, one must rely on the least information impossible.51 The more 
factors taken into consideration in sentencing, the harder it is to fit crimes into neat 
categories; thus any increase in statistical consistency comes at the expense of the 
 
47 Transcript at 86.  
48 Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
161, 175 (1991). 
49 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2003).  
50 Freed, supra note 2, at 1717 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2003)).  
51 Yellen, supra note 14, at 180. 
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consideration of relevant information.52 Ironically, when fewer factors are taken into 
consideration, the less likely it is that the sentence will match the crime.53 As a result of 
the level of generality needed “[t]he guidelines largely ignore culpability by rejecting 
factors such as youth that judges have traditionally relied on to mitigate punishment.”54 
It defies logic to rely on mechanical scoring systems, rather than by looking at the 
circumstances of individual cases.55 In fact, several studies have shown that the more 
detailed information people are given about specific cases, the less rigid and harsh the 
punishments become.56 The commission erred by trying to force the wide range of 
human “characters and actions into an overly engineered structure” because judges 
sentence more effectively if they are permitted to use all of the relevant information.57 
Another flaw of such an impersonal system as evidenced by Mr. Natale’s 
circumstances is that it completely disregards rehabilitation.  Although we are clearly in 
an age of retributive punishment,58 rehabilitation is still a major part of state systems and 
of the public conscious as can be evidenced through the growth of such programs as drug 
courts and group homes.59 Our present system of federal guidelines, and any system 
rigidly centered on statistical consistency, runs afoul to the idea of rehabilitation as such 
programs have to be targeted to characteristics and needs of each offender thus requiring 
 
52 Id. 
53 “Even with guidelines that incorporate differences in criminal history and role in the offense, judicial 
sentencing discretion remains necessary because neither Congress nor a sentencing commission can ever 
anticipate all the variables that might be relevant to a particular case and defendant.”  Zlotnick, supra note 
31, at 667.   
54 Yellen, supra note 14, at 181. 
55 Tonry, supra note 12, at 46.  
56 Id. 
57 Robert Weisberg, Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2005). 
58 Heaney, supra note 48, at 215.  
59 Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1233, 
1253 (2005).  
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individual sentencing.60 Rigid systems that ignore individual offender characteristics are 
a large obstacle to the concept of rehabilitation of criminals.61 
In the wake of Booker, the Guidelines stay intact as does the culture surrounding 
them and relevant information will continue to be ignored.  To say that even though Mr. 
Natale had not committed any action in furtherance of the conspiracy for which he was 
convicted in over ten years was not a factor seems absolutely ridiculous.  It is also 
illogical to ignore the fact that Natale will be seventy-two when he is released, costing the 
prison system thousands each year given the health issues of a man of such an advanced 
age.  Ignoring these factors misses the connection between the individual and the crime 
and focuses purely on the crime.  A system that ignores factors such as education, 
vocational skills, employment, family responsibilities, community ties, age, mental and 
emotional condition, drug dependence, and dependence on crime for a livelihood is 
barbaric in nature and far from the enlightened system that was imagined when the idea 
of sentencing reform sprouted in the academic community.  Sentencing based purely on 
statistical consistency offends the basic principles of our government and constitution - 
the recognition of individual liberty.  We must return to a system that examines offenders 
as individuals taking into account the unique characteristics of each person and 
circumstances surrounding their crimes.   
B. Consistency Leads to Complexity 
The Guidelines combated judicial discretion by severely restricting the ability of 
judges to consider the characteristics of each offender through the use of an immensely 
complex, narrowly tailored, restrictive system.  The extent to which the sentencing 
 
60 Tonry, supra note 12, at 55. 
61 Id. 
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process has been molded around the guidelines and their complexity can be evidenced by 
Mr. Natale’s sentencing hearing.  From the beginning of his sentencing transcript it was 
clear that culpability for the actual crime for which Natale was convicted was only a 
small portion of the proceeding, and in fact was rarely mentioned.  On Mr. Natale’s day 
of sentencing, the nature of the proceeding was unclear - sentencing or guideline 
interpretation.  The sentencing judge divided the hearing into two sections, guideline 
issues and traditional sentencing.62 Stating the traditional sentencing process, actually 
applying the convicted crime to a prison term, would come only after interpreting and 
clarifying all of the guideline issues.63 The first seventy nine pages of Natale’s ninety one 
page sentencing transcript were dedicated to guideline issues; 87% of the entire 
sentencing hearing.64 In addition, during the hearing, the sentencing judge made 
numerous mistakes, these mistakes were corrected, but only after being called to his 
attention by the prosecution and probation officers.65 The judge appeared to be little 
more than a puppet through which the prosecutor and probation officer worked the 
guidelines.  The time spent analyzing Natale individually, his crime, and his culpability, 
amounted to only a few pages devoid of any meaningful analysis.66 Further, the analysis 
and reasoning provided by the court had almost nothing to do with Natale as an 
 
62 Transcript at 2.    
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1-79. 
65 Id. at 15 (Judge confused as to how managerial enhancements intertwine with the safety valve and the 
guidelines, prosecution and defense council help him establish how the proceeding should go forward so as 
to take the correct information into account at the right time.);  “Would you help me out on the last point 
that you made?”  Id. at 79. (Sentencing judge asking probation officer for help in deciphering the rule book 
as to fines and applicable sentencing ranges.);  “Your honor, I don’t have my statute book here, but I 
believe that in imposing the supervised release as to count 1, that the court is also required to impose a 
supervised release as to Count 4 as charged in the indictment.  That’s what the PSI indicates and I don’t 
have 841 to recheck it.”  Id. at 89. (Prosecution correcting judge’s interpretation of the rule book.  After a 
pause where the judge cannot find the answer, the probation officer finally intervenes and gives the correct 
answer, but even so, the judge remains confused as to application of the guidelines and again makes a 
mistake, again corrected by the probation officer.) 
66 Id. at 80-88.  
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individual or criminal, but centered on the ripple effect of the drug trade and how this 
effect relates to the congressional reasoning behind the sentencing guidelines.67 
One of the major fears of conservatives leading into the promulgation of the 
sentencing guidelines was that liberal judges were imposing lenient sentences based on 
individual factors.68 This was believed to be the most significant reason for disparity in 
federal sentencing.69 The Guidelines combated judicial discretion by severely restricting 
the ability of judges to consider the characteristics of each offender through the use of an 
immensely complex, narrowly tailored, restrictive system.70 Technically, this meant that 
at each level of sentencing, the high end of the range could not be more than twenty-five 
percent higher than the low end of the range.71 As a result of such a restrictive number, 
the guidelines had an inordinate number of ranges, forty three to be exact, and too little 
room to differentiate between offenders with similar offenses and very different 
circumstances.72 “The degree of complexity is famously depicted by the 258 box 
sentencing grid.”73 The guidelines are so complex that they require “a 629-page 
guidelines manual with 1100 pages of appendices and more legalisms than Jarndyce v. 
Jarndyce.”74 On a practical level, it makes sense that an attempt to categorize a 
seemingly endless array of possible circumstances so as to curtail discretion would 
require an enormous rule structure.  This level of complexity requires judges to plow 
 
67 “[I]t is because of [the drug trade] that Congress has established these guidelines and they are as severe 
as they are.”  Id. at 86.  
68 Yellen, supra note 14, at 165-66. 
69 Id. 
70 Ronald F. Wright, Making Sense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Complexity and Distrust in 
Sentencing Guidelines, 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 617, 617 (1992). 
71 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2003). 
72 Yellen, supra note 14, at 180. 
73 Weisberg & Miller, supra note 57, at 16. 
74 Id. (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal 
Guidelines, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 85, 85 (2005)). 
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through an immense number of rules, which can divert the purpose of the sentencing 
hearing from a matching of culpability and punishment to a rule interpretation hearing.  
Complex guidelines push judges to spending most of their time deciding procedural 
guideline issues and increasingly less time determining what the sentence should actually 
be.75 
What does all of this mean?  Given the fact that judges must still calculate and 
consider the guidelines in sentencing even after Booker, the flaws evidenced by Mr. 
Natale’s hearing are likely to continue.76 For a convicted prisoner, the sentencing hearing 
is perhaps the second most important proceeding, behind the actual trial.  One would 
think that an event of such magnitude should be a detailed yet thoughtful analysis by the 
judge, with input from counsel analyzing the life of the defendant, the factors leading to 
his crimes, what will best punish and rehabilitate him, and a decision which expresses the 
best efforts of all of the parties to give an appropriate sentence.  Unfortunately, the 
complexity of the guidelines does not allow this.  In fact, the entire sentencing hearing 
degenerates into a messy attempt at the correct interpretation of the guidelines, which 
none of the involved parties can do accurately, with the one person who should be the 
most knowledgeable, the judge, basically at the mercy of the prosecutors and probation 
officers.  An event so important to the liberty of the defendant and to the policy goals of 
the federal government should not be relegated to a guessing game with all of the parties 
pouring through pages of an instruction manual.  It should be a delicate balancing of 
factors as found at trial, and presented by the defendant as to his actual culpability.  The 
inadequate time dedicated to Mr. Natale in this respect was an insult to his liberty as an 
 
75 Heaney, supra note 48, at 164.  
76 Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 175, 177 (2005). 
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American, and an insult to every defendant that passes through the sentencing process. 
Because of the reverberations the Guidelines have had on the sentencing system, the 
entire sentencing process must be revamped in order to correct the flaws resulting from 
the guidelines that have now saturated the sentencing system.       
C. Relevant Conduct – Real Offense Sentencing 
 Perhaps the most unjust aspect of the Guidelines are the relevant conduct 
provisions requiring judges to increase sentences based on offenses for which the 
defendant was not convicted, and may have in fact been acquitted.77 Entering the 
sentencing hearing, Mr. Natale was looking at a sentencing level of 31; he had no 
criminal history points and was the prototypical safety valve defendant.78 Given this 
level, his sentencing range would be 108-135 months, or a maximum of 11 years.79 The 
government proceeded to introduce a multitude of hearsay evidence in order to establish 
that Natale was more than a minor player in the conspiracy.80 But nearly all of the 
evidence focused not on the defendant, but on the actions of his co-defendant Mr. 
Sorrocco.  This hearsay evidence lead to Mr. Natale being found a manager and required 
the judge to adjust Natale’s sentence upward significantly.81 Essentially, Natale was 
sentenced for a crime the jury did not convict him of.  There was no jury trial, no rules of 
evidence, no cross examination on the issue of Natale’s role in the offense and in fact the 
pre-sentence investigation stated Natale was not a manager.  On the record, the judge 
stated that had it not been for the manager status found at sentencing, Natale would have 
 
77 Yellen. Supra note 14, 
78 18 U.S.C 3553 (f) (2003) (Implemented to lessen the harsh sentences for non-violent first time offenders, 
gives direct point reduction from offense level score). 
79 U.S.S.G. § 5A, 18 U.S.C.A. (2003). 
80 Transcript at 61-78. 
81 Id.
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been given the safety valve, and then proceeded to increase his offense level to 37.82 This 
new offense level carried a sentence range of 210-262 months and the defendant was 
sentenced exactly in the middle of that range - 228 months.83 Natale was not convicted 
of managing a drug conspiracy at trial and all of the evidence presented came from the 
notes of the prosecution.84 In one flash of injustice Mr. Natale’s sentence was nearly 
doubled. 
 Booker’s most beneficial outcome has likely been its effect on judicial fact 
finding as required by the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines.85 Even so, the 
real offense or relevant conduct aspects of the Guidelines remain very influential and the 
culture that encourages real offense sentencing perseveres.  Judges are still required to 
calculate sentences as they had done before, and thus the Supreme Court has not yet 
abolished the real offense sentencing at issue.86 “No other sentencing system in the 
world mandates that sentences be increased based on alleged additional offenses for 
which the defendant has not been convicted.”87 Every sentencing system in the United 
States except the Federal system bases offense levels on charged crimes and not on 
alleged ‘relevant conduct.’88 Many times this relevant conduct alone results in sentences 
longer than the conduct charged.89 This is not a rare phenomenon, as data has shown that 
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uncharged conduct increased sentences in over one half of cases.90 Not only do the 
Guidelines actually promote sentencing increases based on conduct defendants were not 
convicted of, often times the government takes advantage of the system by proving just 
enough to get to sentencing.91 The government then relies on the lower burden of proof 
to obtain a longer sentence based on conduct that could not be proven at trial or earlier.92 
Relevant conduct often times does not even have to be formally charged and the 
defendant is often not even informed that this information would or could be used in such 
a manner.93 Relevant conduct evidence may be based on hearsay evidence, sometimes 
even double and triple hearsay.94 Further, a federal appeals court held that “a district 
judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence 
has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”95 This kind of action not only 
offends the constitution, but it encourages law enforcement to illegally obtain evidence 
knowing it will be admissible at sentencing.96 In addition, studies show that challenges to 
relevant conduct evidence sometimes lead to higher sentences based on findings that the 
defendant did not accept responsibility.97 
It is sometimes suggested that prior to the Guidelines, relevant conduct could be 
taken into consideration by judges in sentencing and without any regulation.  This 
 
90 Id. at 210.  
91 Etienne, supra note 9, at 318. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 316. 
94 U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a), 18 U.S.C.A. (2003) (courts can consider information at sentencing without regard 
to its admissibility under the rules of evidence); See United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100, 103 (1990) 
(Defendant guilty of possession with intent to distribute 139 grams of cocaine, relevant conduct brought in 
another 249 grams based on only 2 pieces of evidence.  A multiple hearsay stating that a confidential 
informant told an agent that a third person said the drugs belonged to Fortier, and a taped conversation 
where Fortier claimed ownership of cocaine but not that cocaine specifically.).  
95 Freed, supra note 2, at 1740 (quoting United States v. Tejada, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 2921).  
96 See Saul M. Pilchen, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Undercover Sting Operations: A Defense 
Perspective, 4 Fed. Sent. R. 115, 115 (1991).   
97 Margareth Etienne, supra note 37, at 425.  
19
argument fails for several reasons.  First, judges were not required to charge the conduct 
and to give the severe weights assigned by the guidelines.98 Conduct could be offset by 
the ability of judges to look at a variety of other mitigating factors.99 In addition, back 
end review through the parole system gave the defendant and the government a separate 
opportunity to offset any such considerations at the front end of sentencing.100 
The Booker decision rendered the guidelines advisory and does not require judges 
to make non-jury factual findings.101 However, the relevant conduct aspects remain very 
influential.  Judges are still required to calculate the guidelines range as they had done in 
the past and consider all the factors they previously had under the guidelines.  The 
Supreme Court did not abolish relevant conduct or real offense sentencing.102 And what 
about Mr. Natale?  Had this constitutional violation not occurred he would no longer be 
in prison.  Booker was not applied retroactively and in fact Mr. Natale was denied a re-
sentencing hearing for this very reason.103 Natale is paying the price for an unjust system 
and the unjust culture it has created.  A clear constitutional violation resulting in nearly a 
decade of imprisonment will go un-remedied.  Not only must the sentencing commission 
and congress eliminate real offense sentencing, there must be a just resolution to those 
convicted based on constitutional violations.  Every individual who has spent even one 
additional day in prison due to a violation of his constitutional right deserves justice. If 
not, the very fabric of our Constitution and our system of government will be offended.   
D. A Tainted Culture 
 
98 Heaney, supra note 48, at 216. 
99 Id. at 215. 
100 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1982) (parole and good time credits repealed in 1987). 
101 Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
102 Yellen, supra note 14, at 274.  
103 In Re Roberto Natale, 05-16635-J (11th Cir. December 23, 2005).  
20
Mr. Natale’s sentencing demonstrated an intangible change that resulted from the 
Guidelines and which now reverberates through the entire Federal Court System.  The 
shift of power away from the judge and to the prosecutors and probation officers results 
in further unfairness to defendants and their counsel.104 During Natale’s hearing it was 
clear that the probation officer was the expert of the guidelines while any discretion in 
sentencing was left for the prosecutors.105 In fact the judge conceded to the discretion of 
the probation officer on several occasions.106 These concessions of discretion ranged 
from whether to depart for higher or lower sentences to unfettered belief in investigations 
that were based on evidence not found at trial.107 Even more dramatic is the amount of 
power the prosecutors were given as they controlled the defendant’s sentence and the 
general flow of the proceedings.108 The defense for Natale was at the complete mercy of 
the prosecutor, to the point where the government controlled the defense’s right to object 
to factual findings in the pre-sentence investigation.109 This all took place directly in 
front of the judge, who failed to participate in any bargaining, although it was apparent 
the government was in complete control of the proceedings.110 All of the evidence 
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presented came from the notes of the prosecutors and the findings of the probation 
officer, not from the trial holdings.111 Defense counsel was reduced to battling away at 
powers unfairly waged against Mr. Natale and a system that is clearly advantageous to 
the government.   
 The judicial discretion that many people claimed to be the cause of disparity in 
sentencing prior to the guidelines was merely shifted to other parties, namely prosecutors 
and probation officers.112 District court judges often depend on probation officers to 
apply and interpret guidelines and even to resolve factual disputes.113 Probation officers 
have been criticized for controlling or being guardians of guideline interpretation, and 
their confidential suggested sentence is often taken as law.114 The version of the facts set 
forth in the pre-sentence investigation and the probation officers calculation of the 
sentencing range is usually just accepted by the court without question.115 The probation 
officers suggestions are accepted even though they often do not attend the trial.116 Even 
more alarming is that the government’s files and statements constitute the primary source 
of evidence used at sentencing, evidence that is often inadmissible at trial.117 Defense 
attorneys have been reduced to government negotiators with their primary means of 
accomplishing sentencing goals being conducted primarily through the government and 
plea deals.118 “Although plea bargaining occurs everywhere, in the states with well-
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designed guidelines bargaining takes place in the shadow of the guidelines and has not 
been characterized by widespread circumvention.”119 
The Guidelines not only are unjust by the letter of the law, but intangible changes 
in the power structure of the Federal Courtroom have pushed an even greater burden onto 
defendants.  Probation officers are responsible for the majority of the sentencing 
interpretation while the government controls the proceedings through circumvention 
techniques such as plea dealing away the defense’s right to object or appeal.  The large 
majority of information shared at sentencing comes from the notes of prosecutors and 
probation officers and these parties together essentially decide the fate of the defendant.  
The judge does little more than attempt to hold this complex process together and often 
gets lost in the mass of rules surrounding what should be a procedurally simple 
sentencing hearing.  These power shifts have not been corrected by declaring the 
Guidelines advisory.  They can only be corrected by scrapping the foundation upon 
which the system is built, and moving away from the empirical consistency based model.   
III. Statistical Consistency Does Not Equal Fairness 
 Before his trial, Mr. Natale was offered a plea deal that would have resulted in 
him receiving slightly less than six years in prison for a reduced charge.  He opted to go 
to trial and received nineteen years, which seems very inconsistent.  Consider the person 
who committed the same exact crime yet took the deal, now we have two identical 
defendants receiving vastly different sentences.  This is exactly the thing the guidelines 
were said to be eliminating; disparities in sentences for like offenders.  The reality is that 
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this disparity has been shifted and hidden, and has arguably worsened given the fact that 
96% of federal defendant’s opt for plea deals.120 
The unfairness inherent in a system based purely on aggregate and statistical 
consistency could possibly be justified if it actually resulted in the consistency that it was 
designed to achieve.  But our guidelines system has done nothing but shift and hide 
disparity in sentencing, and the Booker decision has done nothing to address this 
problem.  Everything that we know about the use of statistical outcome based sentencing 
systems has shown that they increase disparities.121 For example, A and B were both 
caught sending 10 grams of cocaine through the mail.  A takes a plea deal and is charged 
with obstruction of justice, B goes to trial and is found guilty of both possession and mail 
fraud.  A and B are receiving different sentences for the same crime, disparity in its most 
basic form.  Real world examples are abundant, such as illegal aliens caught crossing the 
Mexican border with fifty pounds of marijuana, being allowed to plea down to a charge 
of illegal entry.122 Supporters of such a system often point to consistency in statistics 
showing that all offenders convicted of a certain crime are within a certain guidelines 
range, while, in reality, a large number of individuals that committed the same crime are 
receiving different sentences.  Dubbed by many as “new disparity”, disparity under the 
guidelines is a function of intentional coercion of guilty pleas and the degree of disparity 
is much greater than in the past.123 The disparity is now hidden through statistics that 
rely on how often judges depart from the guidelines, and not on whether defendants who 
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commit the same crimes are being sentenced similarly.124 Defendants arrested by the 
same law enforcement officers for the same crimes receive widely different sentences 
based on where they are prosecuted.125 “The simple point is that these guidelines have 
not eliminated “disparities” and that no set of guidelines, no matter how faithfully 
applied, can do so, so long as human beings—law enforcement agents, prosecutors, 
probation officers, and judges—must make decisions affecting the liberty of other human 
beings.”126 Increased disparity is not a hidden reality, it is clearly apparent to anyone 
who digs only marginally into the meaning of consistency as related to our system, and it 
begs the question, why would we want to continue to base our punishment system on 
such a misleading concept?   
Race disparity was another major factor in the implementation of the 
Guidelines.127 In a study by Judge Heaney, pre-guidelines sentences were roughly 
equivalent for all males in the eighteen to thirty-five age group, with two months 
difference between time served for blacks and whites.  But under the guidelines, blacks 
served almost fifty percent more time then whites.128 In addition, the percentage of the 
prison population that is black has continually increased since the implementation of the 
guidelines.129 
There is no disputing the reality that disparity in sentencing continues.  Statistics 
showing that judges sentence within a certain range for a certain crime a certain 
percentage of the time mean next to nothing when judges are not sentencing for the actual 
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crime committed.  Disparity in sentencing continues, and it will always continue.  The 
discretion once held by judges is now shifted into the hands of prosecutors who make 
deals in almost every case that comes before them.  It seems to me that if anyone is going 
to have discretion to make sentencing decisions, it should be judges and not prosecutors.  
It begs the question, how can we accept the injustice resulting from the complexity and 
rigidity of a system necessary for this alleged consistency, when consistency is not what 
we are getting? 
IV. What Does the Future Hold? 
 The Booker decision was the first step in the realization that mechanical 
statistically based sentencing systems, with the primary goal of consistency, cannot work 
in a society based on individuality.  Mr. Natale shows the injustice that is inherent 
throughout such a system.  I am not calling for a complete return to indeterminate 
sentencing.  Sentencing guidelines can be an excellent tool if they are used correctly and 
are developed using the wealth of knowledge that has amassed in our judicial system.  
The opportunity is here for the creation of an enlightened system that accomplishes all of 
the goals of punishment as effectively as possible.  Such a system could bring fairness 
and legitimacy back to sentencing.  
A. Bring Back Parole 
 Although the original parole system was flawed, in theory, its purpose was to 
make an individualized assessment of the needs of each inmate and allow for release only 
when rehabilitation was complete.130 Not only was this a valuable tool for managing the 
prison population and returning offenders to society, but it created incentive among 
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offenders to rehab themselves in hope of being released.131 The old system, however, 
was unwieldy and lacked effective guidance.132 A more controlled version of parole can 
offer significant benefits in the post Booker sentencing world.133 Revamped parole 
guidelines could allow for a more consistent and controlled front end of sentencing, with 
discretion moved to the back end where it is toughest to predict outcomes at the time of 
sentencing.134 As an example of the confidence in parole, notwithstanding the federal 
system, discretionary parole remains the most common approach to sentencing used in 
the United States.135 In order to control a new system of parole, new sentencing 
guidelines would include a system of guidelines designed specifically for parole.136 A
parole system would be beneficial in alleviating the problems inherent in housing older, 
non-violent, first time offenders such as Mr. Natale.  Older offenders usually present little 
chance of re-offending yet cost the prison system an exorbitant amount of money each 
year they age within the system.137 Parole standards could be established that would 
mandate review upon a certain age and amount of time served, leaving the discretion as 
to release to a qualified reviewing body.138 A new and improved Federal parole system 
would be beneficial to society as a whole by adding another check to the sentencing 
system to ensure that sentences are fair and effective.  Discretionary parole would also 
help reduce the costs from an overflowing and aging federal prison population.   
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B. New Guidelines 
 “Congress and the commission can do better this time if they attend more closely 
to the overt functions the sentencing machinery is expected to perform and if they restrain 
themselves from use of sentencing and sentencing reform to pursue latent goals only 
incidentally related, or unrelated, to imposition of just and appropriately preventive 
punishments.”139 The new guidelines should be mandatory not advisory, and they should 
bind judges in a similar fashion as higher court precedents, thus when there is a 
reasonable distinguishable case, the judge should be able to exercise discretion.140 
Statistics could be used to provide judges with guidance as to how similar defendants are 
being sentenced around the nation.  Another necessity of a new guidelines system is that 
it not be overly complex and that it have far fewer, but larger ranges.  For example, 
Minnesota has ten ranges, compared to the federal system’s forty three.141 Wider ranges 
will give the judge an appropriate level of discretion.  The new guidelines must also 
encourage departures from the guidelines to “accommodate cases of greater and lesser 
seriousness.”142 The guidelines must allow consideration of characteristics of the 
defendant as a person including things such as age, education, and family and community 
ties, and non violent offenders, factors which are now prohibited.143 Real offense 
sentencing or relevant conduct mandatory sentencing should be eliminated from any 
future guidelines as they are a clear violation of several constitutional rights.144 Less 
complex guidelines that take into account individual characteristics of offenders and that 
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prohibit real offense sentencing would likely return the discretionary power in sentencing 
to judges, removing it from the hands of prosecutors and probation officers.  New 
guidelines should also attempt to better meet an initial mandate of the sentencing reform 
act – to limit overpopulation of federal prisons.145 Sentencing reform would also benefit 
from a reevaluation of the sentencing commission, ensuring that it does not rely too 
heavily on statistical outcomes and also ensuring that it is mandated to use the expertise 
of federal judges by working directly with the judiciary.146 
The new guidelines must better incorporate the concepts of rehabilitation and 
non-prison alternatives.  Home confinement, drug rehab confinement, community 
service, mandatory restitution, and others are considered to affect recidivism just as 
equally as prison and may be more beneficial to society.147 In fact, studies have shown 
the effectiveness of a large number of treatment programs.148 Programs such as anger 
management, cognitive skills, sex-offender treatment, as well as vocational training have 
been shown to reduce recidivism.149 Some other considerations should be elimination of 
sentence appeal waivers, better data analysis and release, and encouragement of more 
detailed sentence explanation by judges.150 
Most importantly, as professor Tonry stated in a recent article, “overly rigid, 
overly detailed guidelines do not work well.  Experience with state guidelines shows that 
guidelines can at the same time provide meaningful guidance on appropriate sentences 
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for typical cases while allowing judges and counsel sufficient flexibility to adjust 
sentences to take account of particular ethically relevant circumstances in individual 
cases.”151 As an experiment, I sentenced Mr. Natale under the Minnesota Guidelines.  In 
doing so I found that not only would the sentence have been significantly less severe with 
a presumptive sentence of seven years, the judge would have had a reasonable amount of 
discretion to move up or down from the presumptive sentence, and encouragement to 
depart even further when necessary.152 Working with the Minnesota system is simple and 
intuitive, providing meaningful guidance without being overly restrictive.  The Federal 
system could benefit significantly by following in the footsteps of Minnesota and many 
other states that have effective sentencing guidelines.     
C. Stop Mandatory Minimums 
 Mandatory minimum sentences and related topless sentences are unaffected by 
Booker and are some of the harshest and the most unenlightened forms of sentencing 
available.153 Mandatory minimums, like the Guidelines, are overly severe and rigid and 
are in conflict with the goals of justice, consistency, and discretion that are necessary in a 
sentencing system.154 The continued use of mandatory minimums runs contrary to all of 
the goals laid out in this article.  Mandatory minimums suffer from the same problem as 
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the Guidelines, heavy reliance on the least possible information about a defendant.155 For 
example, in drug cases the only factor used for application of the mandatory minimum is 
drug quantity, no other factor is even considered.156 The most recognized failure of 
reliance on only one factor has been termed the “cliff effect.”  Defendants who have a 
quantity of drugs only slightly below the cut off quantity for the mandatory minimum 
sentence are sentenced at significantly lower levels then those with quantities only 
slightly above.157 The path is familiar, this harsh, rigid, unintuitive scheme leads to 
disparity, unfairness, and circumvention through excessive plea deals - many of the same 
problems found in the Guidelines.  The problem with mandatory minimums is best 
summed up in a speech by George Bush senior in 1970 introducing a bill to eliminate 
mandatory minimums.   
“Contrary to what one might imagine, however, [eliminating mandatory 
minimums] will result in better justice and more appropriate sentences.  
For one thing, Federal judges are almost unanimously opposed to 
mandatory minimums, because they remove a great deal of the court’s 
discretion….this is particularly true in cases where addict possessors 
who sell to support their habits are involved, and a great deal of plea 
bargaining in this area results…..Philosophical differences aside, 
practicality requires a sentence structure which is generally acceptable to 
the courts, to prosecutors, and to the general public.”158 
Conclusion 
 During the past decade the prison population in America has more than doubled 
and is substantially higher than any other nation in the world.159 Non-violent crimes such 
as drug crimes result in more severe sentences than sexual abuse, manslaughter, and 
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assault.160 In a Federal Courts Study during the 1990s, out of 270 witnesses, 266 voted 
against the Guidelines and their focus on severity and rigidity, all of them judges, the four 
in favor were three sentencing commissioners and the Attorney General.161 In general, 
large segments of the legal community have expressed disgust with the harsh mechanical 
nature of the Guidelines and similar systems.162 One would think that the large outcry 
from the academic community and the judiciary would quell this desire for consistency, 
but a recent speech by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales was rife with all the same 
buzz words and concepts and called for a system of mandatory minimum topless 
guidelines.163 One statistic in particular stands out as showing that the guidelines are not 
in line with what society considers fair punishment.  The average time served under the 
Guidelines is more than twice that served for a pre-guidelines sentence.164 The average 
sentences of all the sentencing judges would seem to show a judicial consensus as to 
what our judges and thus society consider to be adequate.  Doubling this number is 
clearly a forced increase above the societal norm.  And even worse, a defendant who as 
Mr. Natale did, decides to go to trial, on average will have their sentence doubled.165 Not 
only is this contrary to judicial norms, but studies have shown that the punishment under 
rigid systems or mandatory minimums are more severe than the general public would call 
for.166 
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The federal obsession with disparity has been called pathological and is unwise 
given the clear lack of understanding as to what disparity actually means.167 The average 
objective person would consider it unjust if “they or a family member received a long 
prison sentence not because the offense inherently warranted it but because a law 
requiring that sentence was enacted for reasons having nothing to do with just 
punishment or crime control.”168 Injustice in the case of Mr. Natale, or in any one case, 
cannot be ignored even if it is a statistical anomaly.  Every single instance of injustice is a 
deprivation of the liberties guaranteed by our Constitution.    Any future action by 
congress aimed at correcting sentencing must abandon the obsession with disparity and 
focus on culpability.  Disparity in sentencing will never be eliminated, and focusing on 
disparity as the prime goal of sentencing results in various forms of injustice.  Rendering 
the guidelines advisory under Booker is a step in the right direction, but “no matter how 
much weight is given to the Sentencing Guidelines and how often judges follow them, 
they are still the same deeply flawed Guidelines.”169 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
built around statistical consistency, had a ripple effect that molded the entire sentencing 
process in its wake.  Our experience with such a system demonstrates that we must 
follow a different path into the future and although Booker is a positive step, alone it is 
not enough to cure the deep rooted flaws in the Federal sentencing system.   
In the end, it is people like Roberto Natale who are suffering the consequences of 
the desire for consistency and severity in sentencing.  I felt it was only fitting to end with 
his view on sentencing. 
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“I felt like a baby lamb surrounded by a pack of wolves.  Everything was stacked 
against me, the government, they do these cases every day, they had control.  I went in 
[to sentencing], and was supposed to get 5-10 years, and I could maybe accept that, even 
though this evidence against me, it was all from other guilty people.  You think they 
would look at that, that the evidence was not strong, that I had a clean record, that I was a 
good person and that for years I had not been involved with these people, that my 
education was not good, that I was going to be so old when I got out. You think these 
would be things that would help me, but instead they say I am a manager.  Out of 
nowhere I get double time, all from [government facts], there was no trial and they add 
on all that time. Everyone knew it then, that the new law (the guidelines) was not fair, 
and I saw why, it was a show, to give the [prosecutors] control, to make examples of 
people like me, with low education and everything against me.  It was not fair, and I 
didn’t know how to express it then because I was scared of going to jail, and now these 
cases (booker) say that what happened to me is not fair.  But it continues to be a show, 
these cases are no help to me, they admit my rights are violated, but I still have to deal 
with it.  But it is done now, I have accepted it, I just want to make sure it doesn’t happen 
again, to anyone else.”170 
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